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Introduction
Governments can no longer justify their performance 
in education in terms of inputs; that is, in terms of 
the amount of new money they have provided, or 
the number of new teachers they have employed, 
or the range of new computers they have installed. 
It has been observed that ‘today, educators need to 
show how they have transformed current and new 
dollars into student achievement results, or the 
argument that education needs more - or even the 
current level of - money will be unlikely to attract 
public or political support’ (Odden and Picus, 2008, 
p. 26). Output measures, particularly those related 
to student achievement, are the new bottom line 
in education.
The emphasis on accountability through external 
testing is driven by the growing realisation 
that education is a major factor in economic 
development and the consequent understanding 
that it is the quality of education that is most 
important (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2007). 
Accountability for quality has been given a harder 
edge, often in the face of opposition from the 
education profession, through standardised tests of 
cognitive skills (Popham, 2003).
The essay provides an overview of
The development of output measurement;•	
The extent to which such measures have •	
been used in education systems to improve 
accountability;
Evidence of their effectiveness; and,•	
Implications for Australia. •	
The essay argues that performance measures 
constitute a positive shift in education but they 
haven’t gone far enough. More work needs to be 
done in evaluating the programs that are meant to 
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improve student performance. The programs that 
are designed for the most disadvantaged students 
often escape any systematic form of evaluation 
yet systems need to formally identify what actually 
works, and doesn’t work, in schools.
What is output measurement 
and why is it here?
Accountability systems have been defined as those 
that ‘combine clear standards, external monitoring 
of results, and corresponding rewards and sanctions 
based on performance indicators’ (OECD, 2007a, 
p. 9).
The rise of accountability in education is due 
primarily to the very significant investments made 
into education. A recent McKinsey report found 
that despite ‘massive’ spending on education by 
the world’s governments, totalling $2 trillion in 
2006, performance has barely improved in decades 
(McKinsey and Company, 2007). Other research 
has come to similar findings (Hanushek, 1997; 
Hanushek & Rivkin, 1997; Hanushek and Wößmann, 
2007; Pritchett, 2003; Odden and Picus, 2008; Leigh 
and Ryan, 2008). Pritchett reproduces findings by 
Gundlach, Wößmann & Gmelin (2000) that over 
the period 1970-94, nearly every OECD country 
witnessed an enormous expansion in expenditures 
per pupil, while their maths and science performance 
either flat-lined or deteriorated (see Figure 1). 
The fact that funding does not often correlate 
with performance is a reason for the focus on 
outputs in education. Outputs can be defined as 
an individual’s, school’s, or nation’s performance, as 
measured by standardised tests. A standardised test 
is one where the method of administering the test, 
including the test conditions and system of scoring, 
is regulated and controlled so that it is consistently 
applied across multiple groups. The purpose of 
standardised tests is to better judge achievement by 
relating performance (whether it be by the student, 
teacher, school, or nation), to a wider population.
Output measures have been used in the past to 
criticise education systems and will continue to 
be used for this purpose. Further, the relationship 
between funding and output measures has been 
the subject of heated academic debate (see, for 
example, Hanushek, 1996, and Greenwald, Hedges 
and Laine, 1996a & 1996b). But output measures 
are also an extremely powerful rationale to continue 
justifying increased spending on education.
Key features of output 
measurement systems 
The two main features that distinguish output 
measurement systems are whether:
They have penalties attached or not; and a) 
whether,
They are national in scope or not.b) 
The United States (US) is an example of a system 
that has penalties attached but is not nationally 
organised, while Australia’s system is national but 
does not lead to any specific penalties.
Assessments with penalties attached are often 
referred to as ‘high stakes.’ This term should 
probably be confined to instances where tests are 
truly ‘high stakes,’ such as in exit school examinations 
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Figure 1: Spending and outcomes in the OECD
 Source:  Pritchett (2003), adapted from Gundlach, Wößmann & Gmelin (2000). This data are also reproduced in the McKinsey 
report (2007).
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or medical entrance exams, both of which have 
immediate consequences for the individuals who 
sit them. The type of assessments we are referring 
to are a form of ‘standards test;’ quality control 
systems designed to keep schools, and school 
systems on their toes rather than being ‘high stakes’ 
for the individuals who complete them.
The United States
The US example illustrates how the emphasis on 
education measurement combines with a faith 
in the free market. The efficient operation of any 
market requires good information and this is exactly 
what student testing provides. The idea that market 
forces can advance society much more effectively 
than government intervention is, in fact, one of the 
major reasons behind the introduction of student 
testing on a large scale.
In the US, standardised achievement tests have been 
designed to facilitate a market in education services 
by increasing competition and choice. The US No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) Act was introduced to Congress in 
2001 and signed into law by President Bush in January 
2002 (NCLB, 2002). Colloquially referred to as the No 
Child Left Untested Act, this law encourages students 
to move schools and for schools to be restructured 
as a consequence of continued poor performance in 
testing. Schools not making progress face ‘increasingly 
rigorous sanctions designed to bring about meaningful 
change,’ ranging from supporting students to transfer 
to other public schools to restructuring schools (US 
Department of Education, 2002, p. 17). Thus the 
description, ‘high stakes,’ which, as mentioned above, is 
probably a misnomer.
The language that inaugurated the NCLB Act is 
almost exactly the same as that which heralded the 
start of national student testing in Australia, both of 
which occurred in 2001. Dr David Kemp, Australia’s 
Education Minister at the time, observed that, ‘this 
agenda is all about parents’ rights to have objective 
standards against which they can compare their 
child’s and their school’s performance’ (Kemp, 
2000) while the NCLB Act was designed, ‘so that 
students, teachers, parents, and administrators can 
measure progress against common expectations 
for student academic achievement’ (NCLB Act, Sec 
1001, paragraph 1). Information was the crucial 
issue in both cases, linked in both cases to a desire 
for a more open market in education.
Conventional wisdom in the US is that the NCLB 
Act is ‘on target’ but experts in educational 
measurement note that while it has inaugurated a 
‘testing revolution,’ the law is based on ‘the nearly 
unchallenged belief, with very little supporting 
evidence, that high-stakes testing can and will lead 
to improved education’: ‘Apparently, most policy-
makers assume that accountability in education can 
be accomplished only through the imposition of 
high-stakes testing, although there is no compelling 
body of evidence to support that assumption’ 
(Brennan, 2006, p. 10).
It remains to be seen whether the US experience 
is an aberration or a harbinger of change. The US 
Department of Education points to significant, 
quantifiable gains resulting from the NCLB Act (US 
Department of Education, 2007), while the former 
president of the American Educational Research 
Association, David Berliner, believes these gains to 
be illusory:
If the intended goal of high-stakes testing policy 
is to increase student learning, then that policy 
is not working. While a state’s high-stakes test 
may show increased scores, there is little support 
in these data that such increases are anything 
but the result of test preparation and/or the 
exclusion of students from the testing process 
(Amrien and Berliner, 2002).
Australia
Australia’s system of measuring student 
performance has a unified, national scope although 
Australia’s non-financial school data (the subject of 
this essay) is much more organised than its financial 
data (see Dowling, 2008).
Figure 2 shows a time-line for the introduction 
of national testing in Australia. What becomes 
immediately apparent is that politics and technology 
are closely linked in this chronology. The viability 
of national testing in Australia was dependent on 
the States and Territories maintaining ownership 
of the testing process, which was facilitated by the 
Rasch model of measurement that helped different 
tests be equated so that national data could be 
derived.1 Moreover, Item Response Theory (IRT), 
of which the Rasch model is a part, had only been 
readily accessible, from a practical point of view, for 
about a quarter of a century, with the introduction 
of relatively fast microcomputers in the 1980s 
(Brennan, 2006). But if Australia shows that student 
testing is a product of its time, it remains to be seen 
whether standards testing has come of age.
The question arises as to whether Australia will 
attach penalties to its national testing, and whether 
this development is inevitable. Australia currently 
does not have the same penalties attached to student 
testing as the US but the architecture is in place, 
to a greater degree than in the US, for individual 
schools to be compared on national tests. Part of 
the answer to Australia’s direction lies in what other 
high performing countries are doing in this area.
1 Georg Rasch (1901 - 1980), a Danish mathematician, statistician, 
and psychometrician, created models that allowed items from 
different tests to be equated onto a common measurement 
scale. This in turn meant that test equating was more feasible and 
defensible (Sadeghi, 2006, p. 2 & 8).
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What other countries are doing
Output measures that compare schools with each 
other and with national averages are surprisingly 
under-developed in high performing OECD 
countries. Two related OECD studies recently 
correlated all features of accountability, autonomy 
and choice at the country level with the 2003 
Program of International Student Assessment (PISA). 
A ‘performance study’ correlated achievement data 
while an ‘equity study’ correlated relevant data from 
hundreds of thousands of students from various 
OECD countries (OECD, 2007a & OECD, 2007b). 
In compiling this study, the school background 
questionnaires from the 2003 PISA were used to 
construct country aggregate means of accountability, 
which are reproduced in Table 1.
Table 1:  OECD country means: use of comparative 
assessments (in descending order)
Assessments for:
Country
Comparing 
to district 
and nation
Comparing 
to other 
schools
United States 0.91 0.80
United Kingdom 0.89 0.84
New Zealand 0.87 0.74
Hungary 0.86 0.77
Iceland 0.84 0.66
Sweden 0.73 0.65
Poland 0.71 0.62
Canada 0.70 0.53
Norway 0.64 0.47
Netherlands 0.63 0.47
Korea 0.62 0.55
Turkey 0.59 n/a
Finland 0.56 0.35
Australia 0.55 0.39
Mexico 0.55 n/a
Czech Republic 0.50 0.55
Slovak Republic 0.46 0.48
Italy 0.33 0.29
Portugal 0.33 0.22
Luxembourg 0.22 0.10
Germany 0.21 0.17
Switzerland 0.19 0.16
Spain 0.18 0.17
Japan 0.18 0.12
Ireland 0.17 0.09
Austria 0.12 0.38
Greece 0.12 0.16
Belgium 0.10 0.07
Denmark 0.06 0.03
Source:   OECD, 2007a & b, Table A.2 (Appendix A.3).
The consistently best performing OECD countries 
on PISA (Finland, Japan, the Netherlands and 
Korea; Chinese Taipei not represented in the list) 
are clustered in the middle of the group, with 
Japan near the bottom. These countries’ high 
academic performance is clearly not matched by 
their willingness to compare schools to district or 
national performance, or with each other.
What is also surprising is that none of the top 
performing OECD countries (Finland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Korea, Chinese Taipei) have any 
form of national assessment, certainly none that 
compares to Australia. The situation in each of 
these countries is summarised in Box 1 below, by 
alphabetical order of country:
Box 1:  Student testing regimes in high-performing 
OECD countries
Chinese Taipei
In Chinese Taipei, there are no national assessments 
of student progress for accountability purposes 
although recently, national admission tests have 
been introduced. Since 2006, all Taiwanese junior-
high students (aged 14 - 15 years) have to take 
the Basic Competence Test (BCT) held twice each 
year.  A BCT has also been introduced for sixth 
grade students (aged 11 - 12 years) in Chinese 
and Mathematics (this test also asks students to 
identify the amount of TV watched every day 
and the amount of daily computer usage time). 
The purpose of the year 6 test results is to act 
as a reference only to teaching practices and is 
not made available to the public (Chang, Lee, and 
Yeh, 2006).
Finland
Finland leads the world in literacy and numeracy 
yet it has no large-scale testing programs in 
its elementary schools.  In the 1990s, Finland 
abandoned uniformity in curriculum content 
and moved to basing their teaching and learning 
on curriculum standards while allowing schools 
flexibility in the content of the curriculum in 
achieving these standards (Ministry of Education, 
2006).
Japan
In 2007, the Japanese Education Ministry, through 
the National Institute for Educational Research 
(NIER), conducted its first national survey 
of school academic achievement in 43 years. 
A Nationwide Academic Ability Assessment 
(NAAA) is now administered to students in the 
final year of primary education (11 - 12 years 
of age) and in the final year of lower secondary 
school (14 -15 years of age). These tests assess 
reading, writing and maths, and also ask about 
6
students’ eagerness to learn and their daily life 
habits, including questions such as how many 
hours they study at home and whether they 
eat breakfast every morning. Test results are not 
publicly announced.  Instead, local governments 
and schools receive information on the results. 
Schools can then determine their position by 
comparing the national averages, which will be 
announced by the Government.  Students are 
informed of their results (Andrews, C. et al, 
2007).
Korea
Korea does not have a national assessment of 
student progress for accountability purposes 
but does have a national sample of student 
achievement, the principal aim of which is 
to monitor the curriculum. Small samples of 
students (0.5 to one per cent of the whole 
student population) in Years 6 (aged 11-12 years), 
Year 9 (aged 14-15 years) and Year 10 (aged 15-
16 years) are involved in the assessments and 
two subjects are assessed each year, usually on 
a rotating basis. Korea has recently moved to a 
formal written test rather than multiple choice 
assessments for these national sample tests 
(KICE, 2007 and Andrews, C. et al, 2007).
The Netherlands
The Netherlands do not appear to have national 
assessment of student progress for accountability 
purposes. There is national assessment 
conducted once every five years in the final 
year of primary school, when students are 12 
years of age (known as CITO tests), which relate 
students’ achievement to the main objectives of 
primary education (CITO, 2006). There is also a 
compulsory test at 15 years of age but this is 
only intended to help guide students’ progression 
to the appropriate school and course type 
(Andrews, C. et al, 2007).
The United Kingdom
The UK has developed national student tests for 
accountability purposes from a very early stage. 
A ‘Foundation Stage Profile’ (to be replaced with 
an ‘Early Years Foundation Stage Profile’ in 2008) 
assesses children’s progress and learning needs 
from age three to the end of the academic year 
in which a child has their fifth birthday (Andrews, 
C. et al, 2007).
In regard to national school assessments, all 
students in maintained (publicly funded) schools 
(and some in private, independent schools), at 
the ages of 7, 11 and 14 are assessed via National 
Curriculum Assessment, the purpose of which is 
to improve teaching and learning and provide 
information for parents and the public to help them 
judge the quality of the education being provided. 
Independent (private) schools are encouraged, 
but not required, to take part in these statutory 
assessments. Statutory assessments involve 
externally set and marked tests which have so far 
focused on English, mathematics and science.
If there is a link between output testing and 
performance, one would have thought that 
advanced directions in education measurement 
would be most likely evident in countries at 
the forefront of educational performance and 
improvement (assuming, of course, that academic 
results say something about education systems). 
But as the information in Box 1 makes clear, this is 
not the case.
In Box 1, the country with the most developed 
forms of national assessment, particularly for 
accountability purposes, is the UK, even though it is 
the lowest performing country amongst this group 
of very high performing countries as measured on 
PISA tests. There are three possible explanations 
for this phenomenon:
National testing for accountability purposes a) 
does not improve student performance; 
National testing for accountability purposes b) 
does improve student performance and, if 
introduced, would lift the performance of high 
performing countries even higher; or
Testing for accountability decreases as c) 
performance increases, as there is a decreased 
need to monitor performance.
Of course, there are many reasons behind the 
superiority of Finland, Japan, Korea, Chinese Taipei 
and the Netherlands on PISA tests that have nothing 
to do with educational measurement. These reasons 
include cohesive social structures and relative cultural 
homogeneity. But it would be interesting if these 
countries’ performance improved if accountability 
requirements, based on national tests of cognitive 
skills, were also introduced on a wider basis.
Opposing views on output 
measures and performance
The OECD studies mentioned above found that 
although the highest performing OECD countries 
only moderately use comparative tests, all types of 
accountability systems were, in general, effective, 
whether they were aimed at the student, teacher, 
or the school. Although the OECD authors advised 
caution in interpreting their school accountability 
results, the result was that students perform better 
when their schools use assessments to compare 
themselves to district or national performance 
(OECD, 2007a, p. 29).
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These findings contradict previous research, 
which has found that a jurisdictional emphasis on 
testing for accountability purposes was generally 
ineffective. For example, an influential study of the 
performance of fifty states in America found that 
states that developed extensive testing systems 
coupled with rewards and sanctions failed to 
improve student performance, according to US 
National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) longitudinal data, while states that invested 
heavily in teacher education and standards did 
improve (Darling-Hammond, 2000). The recent 
OECD study contradicts this finding. In fact, the 
OECD performance study found that testing 
for accountability, combined with autonomy and 
choice for schools, produce students who ‘perform 
substantially better on cognitive skills in mathematics, 
science and reading as tested in PISA 2003 than do 
students in school systems with less accountability, 
autonomy, and choice’ (OECD, 2007a, p. 58).
The OECD researchers explained this effect as due 
to better alignment between principals and agents. 
One example of a principal-agent relationship in 
education is when a principal (e.g., the parent) 
commissions an agent (e.g., the head of a school) to 
perform a service (the education of the child) on 
her behalf. Another example is when a government 
(the principal) commissions an education authority 
(the agent) to improve school results (the service) 
for a given state. In both cases, incentives can be 
introduced to make the agent do what the principal 
wants, particularly if the agent’s interests differ from 
that of the principal.
Counter-arguments
The problem noted by many educators is that the 
agent may well do what the principal wants, but at 
the expense of a good education. This is essentially 
what David Berliner says the NCLB Act is doing; 
increasing scores by narrowing focus. Others have 
gone further, stating that the US accountability 
regimes create perverse incentives, such as 
‘curricular reductionism, excessive test-focused 
drilling, and the modelling of dishonesty [where 
teachers act fraudulently to increase test scores]’ 
(Popham, 2003, p.12). The claim of dishonesty is 
levelled system-wide, with the claim that actors in 
accountability systems collude in meeting specified 
targets so that the targets eventually ‘bear as much 
likeness to reality as did the production goals of 
the former USSR’ (Mortimore, 2008). There is a 
widespread belief that these accountability systems, 
at the very least, force teachers to teach to the 
test: ‘The notion that testing limits the nature of 
teaching is pervasive’ (Pellegrino, 2004, p.8).
The putative loss of a better, wider education 
remains at the level of anecdote precisely because 
it cannot be measured. But its relevance can be 
gauged by explanations offered for why money 
appears to have such a low impact on student 
performance. One reason given is that most of the 
extra money has been spent on non-core subjects 
(such as art, music, physical education, drama, 
health, vocational education, etc) and students with 
special needs, precisely those subjects and students 
who are not assessed through standardised tests 
(Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 184). The notion that 
scores are related to what is spent suggests that 
educational measurement may construct new 
values in the classroom.
The common view that testing is not the same as 
learning (and may in fact be harmed by excessive 
testing), has no empirical basis; yet is supported by 
economic explanations for the low impact money 
has on student performance (namely, that the 
money is not focused narrowly enough). However, 
if studies such as those produced by the OECD 
continue to find performance improvement 
through comparative output measures, then the 
use of these systems will increase. In this context, 
more definitive research on the US experience will 
be crucial.
Lessons for Australia
It is unlikely that the Australian system will attach 
penalties to its assessment regime in the near future. 
The fact that many high performing countries do 
not do this and a large proportion of the education 
community is opposed to it would seem to settle the 
matter. But if more and more countries do take this 
path and if technological developments allow school 
and teacher effects to be more precisely identified, 
then the pressure will grow for Australia to move 
in this direction. In this context, the development of 
value-added assessment may be important.
Value-added assessment is a trend that has come 
from within the education sector, largely in response 
to that sector’s resistance to other forms of 
accountability systems. If any accountability system is 
to be imposed on education, most educators would 
prefer it to be one that isolates their effects. This is 
what value-added assessment promises to do.
Value-added assessment focuses on a student’s 
growth over a given period of time rather than 
the absolute levels they attain at a point in time. 
Theoretically, growth reveals the effects of schools 
and teachers while achievement does not. However, 
there are significant problems with value-added 
assessments, including:
Most value-added approaches remain highly •	
technical.
Creating vertical scales is not only statistically •	
challenging, but may introduce more error in 
longitudinal analysis.
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Missing data on student performance, as •	
well as data linking students to teachers, 
may become a significant problem as large 
proportions of students transfer among 
schools every year.
It is unclear whether the estimate obtained •	
from a value-added model could be called a 
teacher or school effect, when all the other 
factors that influence a student’s score are 
taken into account.
(Rand Corporation, 2004 & Doran and Fleischman, 2005).
In 2004, the Rand Corporation advised that ‘the 
current research base is insufficient to support 
the use of value-added modelling for high stakes 
decisions.’ But value-added software programs 
are becoming more widely available, even if 
implementing these models remains complex 
(Doran and Fleischman, 2005). The fact that 
Australia’s new national assessment program will 
continue to use the Rasch model for both vertical 
and horizontal equating suggests the eventual 
arrival of value-added assessments, despite 
the implementation problems.2 As this occurs, 
technological developments that isolate the effect 
of individual schools and teachers on student 
performance will only increase the pressure to use 
these measures for accountability purposes.
Testing may also revert to its tradition role as a 
diagnostic rather than accountability tool. It has been 
predicted that the type of mass testing introduced 
by the NCLB Act and national benchmarking 
in Australia will eventually be considered a 
quaint anachronism: ‘In 21st century learning 
environments, decontextualised, drop-in-from-the-
sky assessments consisting of isolated tasks and 
performances will have zero validity as indices of 
educational attainments’ (Pellegrino, 2004). Rather, 
assessment will become much more targeted 
at mapping students’ knowledge and diagnosing 
students’ misconceptions about specific topics.
The trend towards individual diagnosis matches 
the laudable move towards ‘personalisation’ in 
education, where schools are moving away from 
Fordist principles of standardised mass production 
to systems that are fashioned for the individual 
(Leadbeater, 2004). However, this trend towards 
the individual would not supplant the equally strong 
need for increased accountability of systems. In fact, 
this essay argues that accountability should be even 
more deeply embedded into education practice.  It 
remains the case that there is generally no culture 
of measuring program effectiveness at the school 
2 Horizontal equating places on a common scale tests of the same 
difficulty while vertical equating places on a common scale tests of 
different difficulty, usually tests across different year levels, thus allowing 
longitudinal analysis of individual student performance. Australia’s 
assessment will be both vertical and horizontal in the sense that tests 
at each grade level are equated from one year to the next.
level in Australia, or in most other countries. The 
practice of benchmarking and public identification 
of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ activities in schools is rarely 
conducted in any formal way. For example, one of 
the few evaluations of equity programs in New 
South Wales public schools proposed a system of 
continuous monitoring, review and accountability 
on the assumption that ‘it is essential to identify 
programs that are successful in promoting better 
outcomes for disadvantaged students’ (Lamb & 
Teese, 2005). However, as one of the report’s 
authors, Stephen Lamb, subsequently noted, it was 
a continuing problem world-wide that systems 
simply allocated resources to schools without a 
clear idea on how they would or should be spent 
(The Australian, 7 July, 2008). It remains the case that 
programs and initiatives designed for disadvantaged 
students frequently escape any systematic scrutiny 
of their effects.
The reluctance to evaluate also extends to teaching 
practice. A recent study of the teaching profession 
found that it ‘does not have well-established 
institutions or procedures for using research to 
identify and define standards for what its members 
should know and be able to do - normative 
structures relating to good practice are weak’ 
(ACER, 2008). Yet educators need to know, in more 
detail than they do, what works and doesn’t work 
in schools. It would be a positive result if output 
measures extended further into education, so 
that school programs were regularly and formally 
evaluated in terms of their effectiveness.
Conclusion
Educational assessment is not a new concept. China 
used student tests 3,000 years ago and introduced a 
national civil service examination system 1,500 years 
ago, while modern educational test development 
can be traced to the Industrial Revolution (Oakland 
et al, 2001, p.4). Yet today’s emphasis on output 
measurement is a new phenomenon, one that 
can be traced to an evidence-based management 
philosophy that first transformed Japanese industry 
after the Second World War and was introduced 
more broadly to the West in the 1980s.
There is no doubt that the changes inaugurated 
by output measurement will be profound. This is in 
contrast to a common view that policy changes in 
education are invariably superficial and do not affect 
the reality of school practice. In one striking analogy, 
such policy changes are likened to a storm on the 
ocean: ‘The surface is agitated and turbulent, while 
the ocean floor is calm and serene (if a bit murky). 
Policy churns dramatically, creating the appearance 
of major changes ... while deep below the surface, life 
goes on largely uninterrupted’ (quoted in McKinsey 
and Company, 2007). Output measures will disturb 
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school life below the surface, mainly because of the 
deep need for accountability it responds to and the 
scale of change that is involved.
Output measures are the new currency of an 
educational market; the new ‘bottom line’ upon 
which schools, school systems, and increasingly 
teachers, will be judged. This essay argues that 
standardised performance measures should be 
extended so that equity programs are also evaluated. 
But the question of whether accountability systems 
should have penalties attached to them is another 
matter. Much will depend on authoritative studies of 
existing initiatives and technological innovations will 
also be important, particularly value-added models 
that can isolate the impact of schools and teachers 
on student performance. However, in either case, 
the continuing role of standardised assessments in 
providing reliable information for a new education 
market is inevitable and justified.
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